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The  Gender-related  Development  Index  (GDI)  developed  by  the  United  nations 
Development Program has been one of the first global instrument to demonstrate that the level of 
gender equality in a country is not solely dependent upon a country’s economic performance. 
However,  the  GDI  is  still  closely  tied  to  a  country’s  gross  domestic  product.  Moreover, 
Population share of the genders enter the formulation of this indicator in such a way that it favors 
the better performing gender. In the present note, we implement the corrections proposed by 




ِعامتجلاا عٌنناب تطبتشلما تّششبنا تْمنتهن ُذْهقتنا ششؤلما مّذعت  : ام  ؟تْبشعنا لًذنا بْتترن ثذيح ار
 
صخلم 
ٌنناب تطبتشلما تّششبنا تْمنتنا ساْقن ًاششؤم ِئانملإا ةذحتلما مملأا جماوشب سٌّط عّسٌلما ايفّشعتب تْمنتنا ساْقن وتشباثم ساطإ في  في زخأْن ِعامتجلاا ع
 سٌكزناً ثاولإا ينب ٌُمنتنا صاجلإا في ثًافتنا سابتعلاا ( لاجشناً ءاسننا  ) اد ُذْهقتنا تّششبنا تْمنتنا مْند ششؤم مخ  .  مْند شٌّطتب ءافتحلاا هم مغشنا َهع
في داقتولان ضشعت ذق ِعامتجلاا عٌنهن لذعلما تّششبنا تْمنتنا مْند نأ لاإ ،ِعامتجلاا عٌننا ثاسابتعا ِطغْن وهّذعتً تّششبنا تْمنتنا  تصصختلما ثاْبدلأا 
ذعتب تبناطلما ثاداقتولاا هزى َهع بتشتً  فهتمخ في ينعٌننا ينب امْف ثًافتنا سكعت تينا تٌّمنتنا ثاصاجلإا ًاطابضوا شثكأ تقّشطب سكعتن تْفاضإ ثلاّ
لًذنا   . هسلاكً نادساب َهع ثاْبدلأا هزى ممتشتً   (1999)    ناثاوً ؛بكشلما مْنذنا َهع وتنمْىً بستكلما مخذنا سًذب قهعتّ امْف (2008)    قهعتّ امْف
لإا تبسو فاشحا سًذب  ناثاوً اششْمً ؛لماعنا ٌٍتسم َهع ناكسهن ِعْبطنا عّصٌتنا َهع بتترت تينا تبسننا هع سٌكزهن ثاو (2008)    تقّشطب قهعتّ امْف
ِعامتجلاا عٌننا سابتعلاا ينعب زخلأن لذعلما تّششبنا تْمنتهن بكشلما مْنذنا لىإ لٌصٌهن تعبتلما عْمجتنا .   ةسٌكزلما ثاْبدلأا َهع تقسٌنا هزى ذمتعت    مّذعتن
 هم تنْعن ششؤلما تمْق 122    اينْب هم تبٌهطلما ثامٌهعلما اله ثشفٌت تنًد 15   تْبشع تنًد  .
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1.  Introduction 
 
GDI is a gender-adjusted HDI measured in the equally weighted components, same as the 
HDI, but formulated in a way to take note of the gaps between men and women on each of these 
components. The three components are income at purchasing power parity, education, measured 
in terms of weighted average of adult literacy rate and enrolment ratio; and health in terms of life 
expectancy at birth.  
 
For  each  component  of  GDI,  there  is  an  equally  distributed  equivalent  (EDE) 
achievement (noted  ), which is defined as the level of achievement that, if attained equally 
by women and men, would be judged to be exactly as valuable socially as the actually observed 
achievement (Anand and Sen, 1995). When the achievements of men and women are different, 
higher the difference for a given mean, lower is the value of  .  
 
For a pair of female and male achievements ( ,  ) ;  and proportion 
of  female  and  male  population  ( ),  equally  distributed  equivalent  index 
 is given by the general formula: 
 
(1)   
Aversion to inequality can be controlled through , whose larger value implies a greater 
penalty for achievement gap by both genders. For moderate aversion to inequality  is set at 2, 
which makes   harmonic mean of the male and female values. 
 
Given ( ,  ),  varies between   to   as   vary. A rise in the 
population proportion of the gender with higher level of achievement results in higher  . All 
this is counter intuitive for a development indicator sensitive to gender. 
 
The  GDI  measure  has  its  own  share  of  critiques.  Bardhan  and  Klasen  (1999),  have 
highlighted  the  problem  associated  in  earned  income  component  of  the  GDI  and  how  it 
dominates  over  the  health  and  education  dimensions.  Morrisson  and  Jutting  (2005)  have 3 
 
identified GDI’s failure to account the institutional framework which encompasses the influence 
of traditions, customs, and explicit and implicit laws regarding the role and positions of women. 
Despite  these  criticisms,  the  gender  based  measure  of  GDI  is  a  good  beginning  and  does 
reasonably  well  to  represent  indicator  of  women’s  overall  status  across  countries  and  can 
provides insights into gender equality and directions for further improvements. 
 
Bardhan and Klasen (1999) suggested increasing the aversion to inequality factor applied 
to the longevity and the education components in order to insure substantial penalties for any 
large  gender  gaps  in  these  areas,  with  the  option  of  increasing  the  penalty  in  the  longevity 
component more than the education component. Indeed, relatively small gaps in life expectancy 
already have considerable consequences for gender differences in mortality, while similar gaps 
in  earned  income  may  have  a  smaller  impact  on  overall  well-being.  More  recently,  Nathan 
(2008) points out that GDI needs to be corrected for skewed sex-ratio. Mishra and Nathan (2008) 
and Nathan, Mishra and Reddy (2008), while discussing HDI, suggest that attainment should be 
viewed as an inverse of failure where the latter is calculated as a distance from the ideal. In the 
present note, we incorporate these concerns to the measure of GDI. It is important to note that 
the  second  section  is  largely  inspired  by  Nathan  (2008).  The  author  of  the  note  has  no 
contribution other than the implementation of the suggested corrections. 
 
2.  GDI: The Measure and the Proposed Corrections 
 
 
2.1 Sex-Ratio Correction Factor 
 
According to Nathan (2008), a measure of equally distributed equivalent achievement should 
satisfy the following properties with respect to sex ratio: 
 
Axiom  of  Monotonicity:  Given  the  achievement  level  of  two  genders,  the  equally 




                                                             
(1) The value of ideal sex ratio is under debate and may vary with regions and races. The sex ratio of a population 
depends on three factors: the sex ratio at birth, differential mortality rates between the sexes at different ages, and 
losses and gains through migration (Coale, 1991). In the absence of manipulation, the sex ratio at birth is remarkably 
consistent across human populations, at 1.05 to 1.07 (Coale, 1991, Campbell, 2001). 4 
 
Mathematically, given ( ,  ),   increases as  . The axiom 
of Monotonicity requires   to have a positive and negative slope for   




Axiom of Ideality: Given the achievement level of two genders, the equally distributed 
equivalent achievement maximizes at the ideal sex ratio.  
 
Mathematically, given ( ,  ),  =   for  . 
 
Axiom of Extinction: Irrespective of achievement levels of two genders, if any of the 
genders goes extinct, the equally distributed equivalent achievement reduces to minimum 
possible value i.e. 0. 
 
Mathematically, for any ( ,  ),  =  for   
 
The genesis of the weakness of the conventional measure lies with the absence of penalty 
for  deviating  from  ideal  sex  ratio.  The  construction  of    is  such  that  countries  with 
unbalanced sex ratio get rewarded if sex ratio is biased in favor of the gender with a higher 
attainment. 
 
Imposition of axiom of Monotonicity will make the measure sensitive to deviation from ideal sex 
ratio. Accordingly, a new measure of equally distributed equivalent achievement   is 
proposed: 
 
(2)   
 
where p and   are the actual and ideal proportion of that gender whose actual population is 
less than or equal to the ideal. 5 
 
 
Proposition. The equally distributed equivalent achievement has a convex-decrease for 
fall in proportion of higher performing gender from ideal and a concave-decrease for 
lower performing gender. 
 
Lemma 1. For any given population-proportion between ideality and extinction, when 
higher performing gender has more (less) share than ideal share, the equally distributed 
equivalent  achievement  is  higher  (lower)  than  the  condition  of  gender 
indistinguishability. 
 
Lemma 2. For equal population-proportion of genders at ideal the equally distributed 
equivalent achievement decreases at a faster rate at ideal when population proportion 
falls for the higher performing gender than for the lower one. For condition of gender 
indistinguishability, the rate of decrease lies in between. 
 
2.2 Differentiated Aversion to Inequality Factor 
 
Bardhan and Klasen (1999) stress the fact that aversion to inequality factor applied to the 
longevity and the education components could be increased to insure substantial penalties for 
any large gender gaps in these areas, with the option of increasing the penalty in the longevity 
component more than the education component. This would be consistent with the suggestion 
that relatively small gaps in life expectancy already have considerable consequences for gender 
differences in mortality, while similar gaps in earned income may have a smaller impact on 
overall  well-being.  Thereby,  instead  of  a  uniform  aversion  to  inequality  factor  of  two,  a 
differentiated could be used as follows: 6 for life expectancy gaps, 3 for education gaps 
and 1.5 for earned-income gaps. 
 
2.3 The Displaced Ideal Methods of Aggregation 
 
The conventional method of aggregation indices of different components is linear averaging, 
which assumes perfect substitutability across the three dimensions of GDI. This assumption, means 
that a differential improvement (or increment) in one dimension at any value can be substituted or 
neutralized by an equal differential decline (or decrement) in another dimension at any other value. 
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Mishra and Nathan (2008) discuss this assumption  in the context  of HDI  and shows that  linear 
averaging does not penalize unbalanced development across dimensions. An alternative suggested is 
the displaced ideal (di), which is the inverse of the Euclidian distance from the ideal. Imposing this, 





where H, E and I denote dimensions of health, education and income respectively. 
3.  Empirical results 
 
The achievement data for males and females for the period 2000-2007 are taken from the 
Human Development Reports Statistical Update (UNDP, 1998-2009). The data for population 
sex ratio is obtained from International Labour Organization Database (ILO, Key Indicators of 
the Labour Market, KILM 6
th Edition).  
 
The  calculation  has  been  done  in  two  stages.  First  the  equally  distributed  indices 
corrected for sex ratio (src) and/or differentiated aversion to inequality factor (da),   or 
for  all  dimensions  of  GDI  are  calculated  and  compared  with  the  respective 
conventional values and ranks. Then linear averaging and displaced ideal methods of aggregation 
are separately applied to recalculate GDI for countries and these are used to arrive at ranks. For 
data availability considerations, the constructed database relates to 122 countries including 15 
Arab countries. 
 
In the following we will focus on the relative position of Arab countries. Tables 1-3 show 
the effect of sex ratio correction factor on GDI in 2007, 2003 and 2000 respectively. R1, R3, and 
R5  denote  ranks  of  Arab  countries  among  122  countries  in  health,  education,  and  income 
dimensions respectively. R2, R4, and R6 denote the ranks in the same three dimensions with the 
sex ratio correction factor introduced. The difference in ranks indicates that a negative (positive) 
value  implies  a  worse  (better)  performance  of  the  country  with  the  correction  factor  when 7 
 
compared  with  the  country’s  performance  without  the  correction  factor.  The  countries  with 
skewed sex ratio lose ranks in each of the three dimensions. 
 
The five gulf countries of United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Oman have very high skewed sex-ratio biased towards males. Tables 1-3 list the loss of ranks of 
these countries in different dimensions of GDI. In the dimensions of health and income, the gulf 
countries  have  male achievement higher than  female. With a high proportion  of males  in the 
population these countries get unduly rewarded and enjoy a much higher rank as shown in R1 and R5 
columns. With the introduction of correction factor, these countries loose heavily because of the 
penalty on account of the skewed sex ratio. In the dimension of education in 2007, excepting Oman 
and Saudi Arabia, for all other Gulf countries, female achievement is more than male, the countries 
do not get unduly rewarded in the dimension of education. Nevertheless, with the introduction of 
correction factor the ranks fall in the education dimension also but much less significantly than in the 
others two dimensions. 
 
If Gulf countries are at one extreme of sex ratio, Lebanon and Morocco are at other 
extreme with a relatively higher proportion of female population. However, given that for the 
three dimensions of health, education and income male achievement is higher than females, with 
the introduction of correction factor there is hardly any significant loss in ranks. 
 
Because of their adverse sex ratio the Gulf countries do badly in the overall measure of GDI. 
The top 10 losers in GDI, who have lost 10 or more ranks, are these countries. On the contrary the 
Arab countries with balanced sex ratio have improved their GDI rankings. This is simply because the 
correction factors for these countries are close to unity and hence the   does not fall much 









Table 1: Performance of the Gulf Countries in the three components of GDI, 2007. 
 
Countries  Sex 
ratio 
Equally distributed health index  Equally distributed education index  Equally distributed income index 
Women  Men  R1  R2  R1 - R2  Women  Men  R3  R4  R3 - R4  Women  Men  R5  R6  R5 - R6 
Algeria  1.02  0.768  0.805  61  42  19  0.691  0.805  90  81  9  0.619  0.789  66  60  6 
Bahrain  1.35  0.832  0.862  37  78  -41  0.894  0.889  50  84  -34  0.883  0.996  22  44  -22 
Comoros  1.01  0.662  0.672  91  84  7  0.606  0.703  102  100  2  0.355  0.446  114  113  1 
Jordan  1.06  0.780  0.803  58  34  24  0.846  0.893  62  27  35  0.457  0.733  85  76  9 
Kuwait  1.50  0.872  0.892  31  89  -58  0.880  0.861  63  103  -40  0.920  1.000  4  49  -45 
Lebanon  0.96  0.777  0.788  65  63  2  0.841  0.875  65  66  -1  0.618  0.851  63  63  0 
Mauritania  1.03  0.517  0.537  101  100  1  0.490  0.591  111  108  3  0.441  0.533  96  94  2 
Morocco  0.97  0.763  0.772  73  65  8  0.472  0.671  110  112  -2  0.463  0.702  87  87  0 
Oman  1.30  0.830  0.860  38  69  -31  0.744  0.823  83  97  -14  0.725  0.967  38  58  -20 
Saudi Arabia  1.23  0.793  0.805  54  68  -14  0.789  0.858  75  83  -8  0.683  0.985  42  50  -8 
Sudan  1.01  0.532  0.563  99  99  0  0.471  0.615  112  109  3  0.391  0.574  100  98  2 
Syrian Arab Republic  1.02  0.808  0.828  45  33  12  0.723  0.823  86  77  9  0.453  0.720  86  84  2 
Tunisia  1.01  0.808  0.822  47  36  11  0.723  0.821  87  79  8  0.581  0.795  69  65  4 
United Arab Emirates  2.10  0.853  0.902  29  106  -77  0.872  0.815  73  116  -43  0.870  1.000  6  88  -82 
Yemen  1.02  0.610  0.640  94  91  3  0.411  0.733  113  110  3  0.371  0.603  101  99  2 
 
Note: R1, R3, and R5 denote ranks of 122 countries in health, education, and income dimension respectively. R2, R4, and R6 denote the ranks in the 











Table 2: Performance of the Gulf Countries in the three components of GDI, 2003. 
 
Countries  Sex 
ratio 
Equally distributed health index  Equally distributed education index  Equally distributed income index 
Women  Men  R1  R2  R1 - R2  Women  Men  R3  R4  R3 - R4  Women  Men  R5  R6  R5 - R6 
Algeria  1.02  0.748  0.788  60  45  15  0.641  0.783  91  82  9  0.562  0.756  67  59  8 
Bahrain  1.35  0.807  0.843  37  76  -39  0.837  0.873  60  84  -24  0.725  0.921  32  53  -21 
Comoros  1.01  0.632  0.643  88  83  5  0.467  0.593  106  105  1  0.417  0.516  101  99  2 
Jordan  1.06  0.757  0.790  57  37  20  0.828  0.891  58  35  23  0.500  0.696  82  69  13 
Kuwait  1.54  0.867  0.878  26  88  -62  0.823  0.815  71  102  -31  0.740  0.916  31  70  -39 
Lebanon  0.96  0.778  0.788  54  53  1  0.807  0.873  65  68  -3  0.533  0.727  75  74  1 
Mauritania  1.02  0.447  0.477  100  99  1  0.433  0.553  111  110  1  0.424  0.522  98  93  5 
Morocco  0.97  0.740  0.750  73  63  10  0.435  0.629  108  108  0  0.523  0.675  81  78  3 
Oman  1.33  0.803  0.838  39  75  -36  0.646  0.757  92  103  -11  0.616  0.897  44  65  -21 
Saudi Arabia  1.24  0.773  0.793  53  68  -15  0.652  0.774  89  95  -6  0.633  0.890  43  55  -12 
Sudan  1.01  0.507  0.540  95  94  1  0.449  0.598  107  106  1  0.370  0.561  104  100  4 
Syrian Arab Republic  1.02  0.793  0.818  44  30  14  0.695  0.823  83  75  8  0.461  0.670  86  82  4 
Tunisia  1.02  0.798  0.812  45  31  14  0.689  0.799  86  79  7  0.609  0.775  59  45  14 
United Arab Emirates  2.13  0.877  0.888  23  101  -78  0.860  0.834  64  116  -52  0.715  0.957  25  103  -78 
Yemen  1.03  0.573  0.613  93  89  4  0.327  0.693  114  112  2  0.237  0.434  120  119  1 
 
Note: R1, R3, and R5 denote ranks of 122 countries in health, education, and income dimension respectively. R2, R4, and R6 denote the ranks in the 








Table 3: Performance of the Gulf Countries in the three components of GDI, 2000. 
 
Countries  Sex 
ratio 
Equally distributed health index  Equally distributed education index  Equally distributed income index 
Women  Men  R1  R2  R1 - R2  Women  Men  R3  R4  R3 - R4  Women  Men  R5  R6  R5 - R6 
Algeria  1.02  0.725  0.760  66  53  13  0.611  0.758  92  84  8  0.530  0.734  66  60  6 
Bahrain  1.36  0.805  0.818  38  76  -38  0.827  0.863  55  85  -30  0.709  0.893  32  53  -21 
Comoros  1.01  0.562  0.598  91  91  0  0.435  0.548  107  107  0  0.406  0.503  99  97  2 
Jordan  1.07  0.738  0.777  58  42  16  0.749  0.811  73  64  9  0.478  0.684  81  69  12 
Kuwait  1.55  0.852  0.867  24  85  -61  0.735  0.750  82  104  -22  0.707  0.902  30  70  -40 
Lebanon  0.96  0.785  0.817  44  45  -1  0.805  0.867  62  65  -3  0.501  0.702  77  76  1 
Mauritania  1.02  0.427  0.457  103  101  2  0.324  0.485  112  111  1  0.416  0.512  95  92  3 
Morocco  0.98  0.700  0.722  78  68  10  0.394  0.605  109  108  1  0.502  0.655  80  78  2 
Oman  1.38  0.752  0.787  54  84  -30  0.597  0.731  93  102  -9  0.607  0.899  36  67  -31 
Saudi Arabia  1.24  0.758  0.800  50  70  -20  0.646  0.761  88  93  -5  0.592  0.869  47  57  -10 
Sudan  1.01  0.498  0.535  96  94  2  0.412  0.583  108  105  3  0.357  0.552  103  100  3 
Syrian Arab Republic  1.02  0.748  0.792  55  39  16  0.607  0.805  90  82  8  0.456  0.670  84  79  5 
Tunisia  1.02  0.732  0.775  62  46  16  0.644  0.793  87  79  8  0.586  0.757  61  46  15 
United Arab Emirates  2.08  0.842  0.853  27  100  -73  0.765  0.717  85  114  -29  0.663  0.918  28  102  -74 
Yemen  1.03  0.568  0.615  89  86  3  0.265  0.690  113  112  1  0.233  0.439  119  119  0 
 
Note: R1, R3, and R5 denote ranks of 122 countries in health, education, and income dimension respectively. R2, R4, and R6 denote the ranks in the 
same dimension with the sex ratio correction factor introduced. 
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Displaced ideal has been applied to get the composite index of GDI from its components. 
The comparison between conventional GDI and   has been done after incorporating the 
sex ratio correction factor and taking into account a differentiated aversion to inequality. The 
ranks for these across 122 countries are R7 and R9 respectively (Tables 4-6). The difference in 
ranks  indicates  that  a  negative  (positive)  value  implies  a  worse  (better)  performance  of  the 
country  with  displaced  ideal  when  compared  with  the  country’s  performance  under  linear 
averaging. Those countries which have non uniform or skewed development across the three 
dimensions  of  health,  education  and  income  get  penalized  and  countries  with  uniform  or 
balanced development get rewarded. The spread of the constituting components of GDI, which is 
indicative of uniformity, is the difference between the maximum and minimum values across the 
three dimensions of health, education and income. 
 
Tables 4-6 present the biggest losers and gainers respectively. In 2007, the former are 
those that have lost more than five ranks (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman) ; 
similarly, the latter are those that have gained more than five ranks (Algeria, Tunisia and Syrian 
Arab Republic). 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This  technical  note  has  introduced  and  applied  some  new  perspectives  to  Gender 
Development Index (GDI) measurement. First, it accounts for the fact that countries must get the 
signal from GDI that they must maintain their sex ratio. Accordingly, a correction factor has 
been introduced, on the basis of which any deviation of ideal sex ratio is penalized. The second 
correction is based on the notion that GDI must indicate non-uniformity in development across 
dimensions of health, education and income. Application of displaced ideal technique captures 
this anomaly and penalizes the countries where for non-uniform development across dimensions. 
The losers and gainers on account of this correction are discussed. 12 
 
 




                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Countries  Health  Education  Income  GDI  GDIsrc,di  R7  R9  R7 - R9  Spread 
Algeria  0.786  0.744  0.695  0.742  0.729  73  64  9  0.092 
Bahrain  0.849  0.891  0.945  0.895  0.778  31  45  -14  0.096 
Comoros  0.667  0.651  0.395  0.571  0.543  96  96  0  0.271 
Jordan  0.792  0.870  0.566  0.743  0.714  71  67  4  0.303 
Kuwait  0.884  0.868  1.000  0.922  0.752  25  56  -31  0.132 
Lebanon  0.782  0.857  0.714  0.785  0.746  61  58  3  0.143 
Mauritania  0.527  0.537  0.483  0.516  0.509  106  104  2  0.053 
Morocco  0.767  0.552  0.556  0.625  0.588  91  92  -1  0.215 
Oman  0.847  0.787  0.844  0.826  0.735  48  60  -12  0.060 
Saudi Arabia  0.800  0.826  0.822  0.816  0.753  52  55  -3  0.026 
Sudan  0.547  0.534  0.466  0.515  0.505  107  106  1  0.082 
Syrian Arab Republic  0.818  0.770  0.557  0.715  0.687  81  74  7  0.261 
Tunisia  0.815  0.769  0.672  0.752  0.734  69  61  8  0.143 
United Arab Emirates  0.885  0.832  1.000  0.908  0.598  27  90  -63  0.168 
Yemen  0.625  0.528  0.460  0.538  0.522  101  97  4  0.164 13 
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Table 5: Losers and Gainers in GDI under Displaced Ideal, 2003 
 
Countries  Health  Education  Income  GDI  GDIsrc,di  R7  R9  R7 - R9  Spread 
Algeria  0.768  0.706  0.645  0.706  0.692  76  67  9  0.123 
Bahrain  0.827  0.857  0.826  0.837  0.730  38  51  -13  0.032 
Comoros  0.637  0.523  0.462  0.541  0.523  94  93  1  0.176 
Jordan  0.773  0.859  0.585  0.739  0.713  69  60  9  0.274 
Kuwait  0.874  0.818  0.838  0.843  0.681  36  69  -33  0.056 
Lebanon  0.783  0.838  0.613  0.745  0.699  64  63  1  0.225 
Mauritania  0.461  0.486  0.469  0.472  0.465  107  103  4  0.025 
Morocco  0.745  0.513  0.588  0.615  0.580  90  86  4  0.232 
Oman  0.823  0.705  0.751  0.760  0.665  57  73  -16  0.118 
Saudi Arabia  0.784  0.714  0.753  0.751  0.687  61  68  -7  0.070 
Sudan  0.523  0.514  0.447  0.494  0.484  102  99  3  0.076 
Syrian Arab Republic  0.806  0.754  0.547  0.702  0.675  77  70  7  0.259 
Tunisia  0.805  0.740  0.683  0.743  0.727  65  53  12  0.122 
United Arab Emirates  0.884  0.842  0.863  0.863  0.567  28  89  -61  0.042 







Table 6: Losers and Gainers in GDI under Displaced Ideal, 2000 
 
Countries  Health  Education  Income  GDI  GDIsrc,di  R7  R9  R7 - R9  Spread 
Algeria  0.742  0.677  0.616  0.679  0.665  79  69  10  0.126 
Bahrain  0.813  0.847  0.805  0.821  0.715  35  51  -16  0.043 
Comoros  0.579  0.485  0.449  0.505  0.490  99  96  3  0.130 
Jordan  0.758  0.780  0.566  0.701  0.681  74  66  8  0.214 
Kuwait  0.861  0.744  0.814  0.806  0.646  39  76  -37  0.117 
Lebanon  0.800  0.835  0.583  0.739  0.690  60  64  -4  0.252 
Mauritania  0.441  0.389  0.460  0.430  0.420  110  108  2  0.071 
Morocco  0.711  0.476  0.567  0.585  0.551  90  88  2  0.234 
Oman  0.772  0.668  0.748  0.729  0.627  65  79  -14  0.104 
Saudi Arabia  0.781  0.705  0.719  0.735  0.672  62  67  -5  0.076 
Sudan  0.516  0.483  0.434  0.478  0.468  101  99  2  0.082 
Syrian Arab Republic  0.770  0.693  0.544  0.669  0.646  81  75  6  0.226 
Tunisia  0.753  0.711  0.661  0.709  0.695  71  60  11  0.092 
United Arab Emirates  0.850  0.732  0.816  0.799  0.532  41  91  -50  0.118 
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